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STATE OF UTAH
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)
)
)
)
)
)
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)
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)
)
)
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)
)
)
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)
)
)
)
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Case No. 16596

)
)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-)

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to determine the person lawfully
entitled to the proceeds of a life insurance policy on the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

life of Ronald Hooker.

American Western Life Insurance

Company (hereinafter "American Western") paid the proceeds of
the policy (Policy #44498) to defendant Vonice Hooker, but
brought this action when defendant Helen Mallard later claimed
the proceeds.
Defendant Helen Mallard counterclaimed for the proceeds
of Policy #44498 and for the proceeds of an additional policy
on Ronald Hooker's life as well, Policy #43476.

She also

cross-claimed against defendant Venice Hooker individually
for the proceeds of Policy #44498 which Vonice had received
from American Western, and filed a third-party complaint
against Venice as executrix of Ronald Hooker's estate, claiming
the estate was unjustly enriched bv receiving the proceeds
of Policy #44498.
Defendant Vonice Hooker counterclaimed against American
Western, claiming the company had wrongfully garnished the
balance of the proceeds of Policy i44498 remaining in her
checking account at the col!Ul\encement of the action.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER cou:q'I'
Defendant Helen Mallard moved for sUI!Ul\ary judgment
against American Western on both Policy #44498 and Policy
#43476.
Defendant Venice Hooker movea. for partial sUI!Ul\ary
judgment against American ~·/estern and Helen Mallard on Policy
#44498 and against Helen Mallard on her cross-complaint; and

-2-
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for summary judgment against Helen Mallard on her third-party
complaint.
American Western moved for partial summary judgment
against Helen Mallard on her counterclaim.
The court ruled as follows:
1.

It granted Venice Hooker's motion for summary

judgment against American Western, dismissed the complaint
with prejudice, and released the balance of the proceeds of
Policy #44498 to Venice Hooker.
2.

It granted Vonice Hooker's motion for sumrnary

judgment against Helen Mallard and dismissed Mallard's crossclaim with prejudice.
3.

It granted Vonice Hooker's motion for summary

judgment as executrix of Ronald Hooker's estate against Helen
Mallard and dismissed Mallard's third-party complaint with
?rejudice.
4.

It denied Helen Mallard's motion for summary

judgment against American Western, granted American Western's
motion for summary judgment against Helen Mallard, and dismissed Mallard's counterclaim against American Western with
prejudice.
Defendant Helen Mallard moved for reconsideration,
which the court denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
American Western seeks affirmation of the trial court's
order and dismissal of Helen Mallard's appeal.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1972, Ronald Hooker insured his life by taking out
Policy #43476 issued by American Western.

He had just con-

structed an apartment building and had financed it by
mortgaging the house which his wife, Helen, had previouslv
owned free and clear.

(Depo. Helen Mallard 40).

He bought

the insurance to pay off the apartment indebtedness in the
event of his death.

It was a 20-year decreasing term policy.

The face amount was $75,000 and Helen was the beneficiary.
(R. 140, 147).
In 1973, Mr. Hooker and Helen built a new store for his
appliance business.

They borrowed further against both the

house and apartments to finance the new store.

At Helen's

insistence, Mr. Hooker purchased an additional 20-year term
life insurance policy, #44498, from American Western to pay off
the additional debt on the house.

( Depo. Helen Mallard 41-42).

The face amount was $75,000, and Helen was the beneficiary.
In 1977, Mr. Hooker sold the apartments and paid off the debt
on Helen's house.
Helen was the bookkeeper for the store, and her duties
included payment of insurance, including the two life
insurance policies.

(Depo. Helen ~1allard 10, 11, 15, 24).

According to her testimony, she handled all contact with the
agents, processed all paperwork, with Ronald's aid where
necessary, and made sure the premiums were paid.
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According to Helen's testimony, in 1974, acting under
the belief that the proceeds of the Policies would be paid
into Ronald's estate unless she was named owner as well as
beneficiary, Helen had Ronald sign change of ownership designations on both policies naming her as owner.
Mallard 9, 10, 12; R. 105-106).
the forms in July of 1974.

(Depo. Helen

American Western received

The form for Policy #43476 was

properly attached as a rider to that policy.

(Depo. Elspeth

Forbes 13-14; Depo. Helen Mallard, Exhibits P-1, P-2).

The

form for Policy #44498 was not attached as a rider to that
policy, but was apparently misfiled in the folder for
Policy #43476.

(Depo. Elspeth Forbes 13-141 Deoo. Helen

Mallard, Exhibit P-3).

American Western sent a letter to

Ronald confirming that the requested change of ownership on
Policy #43476 had been recorded and enclosing a copy to be
filed with his policy.
Policy #44498.

No such letter was ever sent on

(Depo. Elspeth Forbes 14-15; Depo. Helen

Mallard, Exhibits P-1, P-2, P-3).

Although Helen claims she

handled all such matters, she made no inquiry why she received
notice of change on one policy but not on the other.
Helen Mallard 17-18).

(Depo.

After the change, American Western

continued to address all correspondence and premium notices
to Ronald (Depo. Helen Mallard 45-46), although Helen contends
she continued to handle payment.

-5-

(De~o. Helen Mallard 24) ·
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In December 1975, Ronald and Helen were divorced.
Ronald's company, Hooker's Appliance, had paid the annual
life insurance premiums current to December 1976.
Helen Mallard 24).

(Depo.

No provision was made in the divorce

decree about life insurance, and the parties did not discuss
the matter at the time of the divorce.
46; R. 133-134).

(Depo. Helen Mallard

Helen remarried in the spring of 1976.

After her remarriage, she came to an oral agreement with
Ronald that he would keep the premiums paid and would inform
her before letting them lapse.

(Depo. Helen Mallard 46-47).

She made no further inquiries of Ronald or American Western
apout the policies during Ronald's lifetime.

When she moved

from the parties' prior address, she made no effort to
inform American Western of her new address.

(Depa. Helen

Mallard 25).
Shortly before Ronald sold the apartments and paid
off the debt on Helen's house, he allowed Policv #43476 to
lapse.

He did not make the annual premium payment due

December 1976 on the policy, and it lapsed for nonpayment at
the end of the policy's grace period 31 days later.

He kept

Policy #44498 current but, representing himself to be the
owner of the policy, submitted a request in December 1976 to
change the beneficiary to Venice Hooker, whom he had married
in October of that year.

American Western recorded the chanqe

of beneficiary by attaching a copy of the form to Policy #4449 8·
(Depo. Elspeth Forbes, Exhibit D-1).
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Ronald died September 17, 1977.

Venice filed a claim

on Policy #44498, which American Western promptly paid by a
check in the sum of $67,500 dated September 27, 1977.

on

October 19, 1977, Helen's counsel demanded payment to Helen
on Policy #43476.

(Depo. Helen Mallard, Exhibit P-4).

Upon

checking that file, American Western found the misfiled change
of ownership designation on Policy #44498.

American Western

then filed this action to determine the person entitled to
payment on Policy #44498 and attached the balance of the proceeds of the policy still remaining in Venice's checking
account, about $20,000.
ARGUMENT
At the time American Western commenced this action,
it did not know sufficient facts to determine the proper
beneficiary of Policy #44498.

It therefore sought a declara-

tion by the court of which defendant was entitled to the
proceeds.

The undisputed facts later developed by discovery

demonstrate, however, that the court below ruled correctly
that Venice Hooker was the policy beneficiary.

This argument

is accordingly submitted in support of the trial court's
ruling.
POINT I
THE PROCEEDS OF POLICY #44498 WERE PROPERLY
PAID TO VONICE HOOKER AS BENEFICIARY
The trial court ruled properly that Vonice Hooker was
the beneficiary of Policy #44498 at the time of Ronald Hooker's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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death.

Ronald, as the insured, had the right by the explicit

terms of the policy to designate Vonice as beneficiary and to
agree to any other changes or amendments.

He made Vonice the

beneficiary by proper form executed December 17, 1976, which
American Western attached as a rider to the policy.

American

Western properly paid Vonice the proceeds of the policy and
is not obligated to Helen, the prior beneficiary.
Ronald's assignment to Helen of rights of ownership in
July of 1974 did not divest him of the right to change the
beneficiary for two reasons.

First, under the explicit terms

of the policy, he retained the right as the insured to agree
to changes or amendments to the policy.

Second, the intent

of the parties, as disclosed by Helen's own testimony, was
that the assignment to Helen was not absolute, but was for
the purposes of avoiding probate and securing payment of
the mortgage on Helen's house.

Once Ronald had removed the

mortgage by payment of the debt, he was free to dispose of
the policy proceeds as he chose.
A.

Ronald Hooker had the right as the
insured to designate Vonice the beneficiarv.

The clear and unambiguous terms of the policy control
the various rights and obligations of the insured, the owner,
the beneficiary, and the insurer.

Under the terms of Policy

#44498, Ronald Hooker had full authority as the insured to
make changes in or amendments to the policy.

The oolicy

provides:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Control of Policy -- During the minority of the
Insured ~he ri~ht to exercise all privileges
under this Policy and to agree with the Company
as to any change in or amendment to this Policv
s~all.vest ~uccessively, during their respectiv~
life~imes, in th7 ?wner, the Beneficiary, the
Contingent Beneficiary, if any, and the Insured.
After ~he Insured has attained his majority,
such rights shall vest solely in the Insured
unless otherwise provided in the Policy. (emphasis
added) (Depa. Helen Mallard, Exhibit P-6).
Appellant Helen Mallard argues that the
change of ownership form executed by Ronald Hooker in 1974
operated to divest Ronald of all such rights and vest them
exclusively in Helen.

What Appellant ignores is that the

form transferred only the rights of the owner, not of the
insured.

As between the owner and the insured, the explicit

language quoted above allocates to the insured the right to
amend the policy.

So long as Ronald, not Helen, was the

insured under the policy, the right to change the policy
remained vested in Ronald.
Twice in her Statement of Facts, Appellant states that
the change of policy ownership designation named her as
"irrevocable beneficiary."

(Appellant's Brief 3, 6).

is factually false and legally wrong.

That

No such words, nor

indeed any mention whatever of "revocability" of beneficiary
appears on the documents.

As to the legal conclusion that

Helen was thereby "named" irrevocable beneficiary, the policy
terms quoted above clearly reserve to the insured the right
to change or amend the policy, notwithstanding the rights of
the owner.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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B.

The 1974 change of ownership was not absolute
and did not divest Ronald Hooker of ownership.

When Ronald assigned ownership of the policy to Helen
in 1974, he did it in an attempt to avoid probate, and as
security for repayment of the mortgage he had placed on Helen's
house.

When he repaid the loan and removed the mortgage in

1977, the assignment of the policy terminated, and Ronald
could designate Vonice as beneficiary.
Parol evidence is admissible to show that an assignment
of a life insurance policy, although absolute on its face,
was intended only conditionally.

In Moser v. Moser, 117

Ariz. 312, 572 P.2d 446 (1977), a divorce action, a husband
had assigned life insurance policies to his wife by assignments
absolute on their face.

The court stateCT:

Appellant [the wife] contends that the assignment of the policies was conclusive and that
appellee cannot contend that she [the wife] was
not the absolute owner. We do not agree.
As
we remarked in Neely v. Neely, 115 App. 47,
563 P.2d 302 (1977), a case also involving the
transfer of ownership of insurance policies,
the mere form of a life insurance policy is
not conclusive as to either ownership or whether
a gift has been made. Donative intent must be
ascertained in light of all the circumstances.
572 P.2d at 448.
Examining the intent of the parties as demonstrated by their
conduct, the court found that the husband, as here, intended
merely to gain certain probate and estate tax benefits, and
had no intent to give up the incidents of ownership and
control of the policy.

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The court in Neely, cited above, came to the same
conclusion under similar facts.

J ust as in
·
the present case,

the wife contended that:
[W)hen.one spouse h~s turned over ownership
of an insurance policy to another spouse in
order to avoid estate taxes it is conclusive
and incontrovertible that a gift has been
created.
563 P.2d at 305.
The court disposed of the wife's argument in two
words:

"We disagree."

Id.

The court found that although the

language of the assignment was absolute, the intent of the
parties was to bypass the husband's estate in avoidance of
estate taxes, and the husband had therefore not divested
himself of ownership or control of the policies.

The assign-

ment of ownership in the present case was for a similar,
although mistaken, purpose:

an attempt to avoid probate.

Appellant's testimony is:
Shortly after the policies were taken out, the
insurance agent was in the store one day talking
about ownerships of the policies. He advised me
that if I was not the owner and anything should
happen to the Decedent, Ronald Hooker, that the
insurance would have to go into probate, and in
order to stoD this, I would have to be the owner.
It was at this time that the policies were changed,
namina me as owner, and this was the understanding
that i had.
(R. 106).
Her testimony in her deposition is the same.

After

apparently coming to a misunderstanding that unless the
beneficiary is also the owner, the proceeds will be paid into
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the estate and not be available to pay bills, she requested
the agent to prepare the change of ownership papers,
"because if this is the case, I would like
the insurance policies put as me as the
owner." And so this was done at that time.
Depo. Helen Mallard 9, 10.
Appellant reiterates the same testimony at page 12 of her
deposition.
By Appellant's repeated admission, then, it is undisputed
that the sole purpose of the change of ownership was to attempt
to avoid probate.

Under the reasoning of the Moser and Neely

cases, such an assignment does not divest the insured of his
rights as owner.
The most that can be said for the assignment is that
it was made to assure Helen that the original purpose of the
policy would be carried out:
be paid.

the mortgage on her house would

Such assignments to assure payment of debt are

quite common, and can be shown by parol evidence.

In Price

v. First Nat'l Bank of Atchison, 60 Kan. 743, 64 P. 639

(1901),

a husband, as insured, and wife, as owner and beneficiary,
made an assignment to a creditor bank absolute on its face.
The court held:
Parol evidence was admissible for the purpose
of showing that, although such assignment was
absolute on its face, the real intent of the
parties was that the insurance policy should be
turned over to the bank under such assignment
for the purpose of collateral security merely.
64 P. at 641.
See also Albrent v. Spencer, 275 Wis. 127, 81 N.W.2d 555 1957);
Boyle v. Crimm, 363 Mo.

731, 253 S.W.2d 149 (1952).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12-

In the present case, Helen's own testimony shows
unequivocally that Policy #44498 was taken out to assure
payment of the mortgage Ronald had placed on her house to
secure his business debts.

I n h er d eposition, she states:

Q The second policy [#44498] was taken out to
basically cover obligations for the new store;
that is correct, isn't it?
A I took it out because I figured it would
cover the loan I had on my home.

Q

It was not taken out for the new store?

A Well, I borrowed--my parents built my home,
and my home was free and clear, and I borrowed
money against my home to build the store. so
it was to pay for it if something happened, so
I would have my home.
Depo. Helen Mallard 24.
At most, then, Ronald's assignment of the policies to her must
be construed as being made in an attempt to avoid probate and
to secure payment of the debt.
The effect of an assignment of a life insurance policy
as security for a debt is not to divest the insured of his
interest in the policy but merely to create a lien in favor
of the assignee to the extent of the debt.

Once the debt is

paid, the policy continues in effect as if there had been no
assignment.

Males v. New York Life Ins. Co., 367 N.Y.S.2d

575, 48 A.D.2d SO

(N.Y.A.D. 1975).

Ins. Co., 452 S.W.2d l

In Green v. American Nat'l

(Tex. Civ. App. 1970), the court held

that a creditor transferree of a life insurance policy acquires
no greater interest than will pay the debt.

No matter what
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form the instrument of transfer assumes, the court stated,
it must be construed either as a mortgage to secure the debt
or a pledge of enough of the proceeds to pay the debt.

See

also Albrent v. Spencer, cited above; Parramore v. Williams,
215 Ga. 179, 109 S.E.2d 745 (1937).
In the present case, the assignment to Helen, although
absolute in form, conveyed at most only an interest sufficient
to discharge the debt on her house.

Once Ronald had dis-

charged that debt, which he did in 1977, the policies continued
in effect as if there had been no assignment.
Moreover, the conduct of the parties after the assignment demonstrates unequivocally that neither Ronald, Helen nor
American Western ever construed the 1974 change of ownership
document on Policy #44498 to vest absolute ownership rights
in Helen.

Under universally accepted canons of construction

of insurance policies, the construction placed upon the policy
by the parties themselves, as demonstrated by their conduct,
will be applied by the court.
In Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Taylor, 76 Kan. 392,
91 P. 1070 (1907), a dispute about the coverage of a fire
insurance policy, the court stated:
If the parties acted upon a contract ambiguous
in any way, and such action indicates their
mutual understanding as to its ambiguous
provisions, the courts will usually adopt
such interpretation as most likely to accord
with the original intent.
91 P. at 1072.
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In Continental Cas. Co. v. Goodnature, 170 Okla.
477, 41 P.2d 77 (1935), construing the extent of coverage
under a workman's compensation policy, the court stated:
When a policy of insurance is susceptible
of a construction placed thereon by the
parties thereto, such construction-should
ordinarily be adopted bv the courts as
controlling.
41 P.2d at 80.
In Candelaria v. Columbian Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 60 Colo.
340, 153 P. 447 (1915), the court found that the parties had
agreed to a construction of a life insurance policy that it
would lapse at the due date of the next premium if not paid,
and a loan on the policy would be extinguished.

Although no

language in the policy so provided, the court stated:
This construction not being in conflict with
any language in the policy, nor in violation
of any statute, authorized regulation, nor
against public policy, the court ought not to
be called upon later to put to it a different
meaning than agreed to and acted upon by the
parties to it and those interested therein.
153 P. at 448.
In Chemtec Midwest Services, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of
North America, 290 F. Supp. 106 (W.D.Wis. 1968), the court
considered whether a liability policy covering injuries
arising by "accident" covered breach of warranty as well as
negligence claims.

The court stated:

Where an insurance contract is uncertain and
the intention of the parties is not clearly
ascertainable from the policy itself, the
courts will take into consideration the apparent object or purpose of the insuranc7 and,
in the context of the policy, the subJect m~tter
of the insurance, the situation of the pa:t1es,
and the circumstances surrounding the making
of the contract.
290
F. Supp. at 109.
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see also Kraus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 258 F. Supp. 407 (W.D.
Pa. 1966) at 411, aff'd 379 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1967); 12 Couch
on Insurance 2d 45:5; 7 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice,
§

4317.
In the present situation, the conduct of the parties

unequivocally demonstrates none of them ever had the intent
to transfer to Helen the ownership of Policy #44498.

First,

the sole reason that Helen requested the change of ownership
was a mistake of law:

she thought that unless she was both

owner and beneficiary, the proceeds would be paid to Ronald's
estate, not directly to her as beneficiary.

Thus, at the

time of transfer, the parties had no intent to transfer the
right to designate the beneficiary but merely to avoid
probate of the proceeds.
Second, American Western never recorded the proposed
change in the file of Policy #44498.

The company never sent

notice of change of ownership to either Helen or Ronald on
Policy #44498, in contrast to the notice of change sent on
Policy #43476.

Third, Helen never objected to receiving

notice of change on one policy but not the other, although
according to her testimony she was in full charge of all
insurance matters.

Had she really intended that both policies

be changed, she could have been expected to take some action
upon being told that only Policy #43476 had been changed.
Fourth, American Western continued to treat Ronald as
retaining all incidents of ownership of the policy.

It

addressed all notices to him, including the notice of change
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of ownership and all premium notices.

From July 1974 through

December 1975, Helen knew that American ~estern was for all
practical purposes treating Ronald as the owner.

She

acquiesced in this arrangement, paying from appliance company
funds the premiums addressed to Ronald.

She never took a

single step to assert any right of ownership herself.
Fifth, after the divorce, Helen did nothing whatever
about the insurance, leaving all decisions and actions to
Ronald.
paid.

She never even inquired whether the premiums had been
She made no provision in the divorce decree for main-

taining insurance.

She did not even bother to inform the

company of her whereabouts when she moved.

Had she really

considered herself the owner of the policies, with full
rights of control, she could have been expected to exercise,
protect or at least inquire about the policies.
Sixth, when she did make a claim, through her counsel,
she claimed only under Policy #43476.

Clearly, she never

considered herself the owner of Policy #44498 or she would
have claimed under that policy as well.
then,
According to the undisputed facts in the record,
policy was
it is apparent that the original purpose of the
house, which Ronald
to secure repayment of the loan on Helen's
the assignment was
later discharged; that the sole purpose of
a mistaken attempt to avoid probate; that Ronald continued
to exercise all rights of ownership of the policy after the

-17-
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assignment; and that Helen acquiesced in that understanding
and never herself evidenced any intent to exercise any ownership rights.

This court should not allow Helen now to come

forward for the first time and, contrary to the manifest
intent of the parties, claim absolute ownership of the
policy.
POINT II
POLICY #43476 LAPSED FOR NONPAYMENT
Appellant does not dispute that the premium on Policy
#43476 due December 1976 has never been paid or tendered.
She admits that American Western sent notice of lapse of
the policy to Ronald Hooker at the address all previous
correspondence and notices had borne.
17-18; Depo. Helen Mallard 45, 46).

(Appellant's Brief
She contends, however, that

the policy could not lapse because she herself never received
notice of lapse.

The foolishness of this contention is

obvious when it is examined in light of the explicit terms
of the policy, the case law, and the statutory scheme
regulating lapse of life insurance.
Policy #43476 provides unequivocally that it lapses
automatically 31 days after any premium remains unpaid:
If any premium is not paid when due, such
premium shall be in default, and at the
expiration of the grace period hereinafter
provided, this Policy shall lapse as of the
date to which premiums have been paid and
shall become of no value.

-18-
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* * *
A grace period of thirty-one days without
interest ~ill be allowed for the payment of
eac~ premium after the first during which
~eriod of grace the Policy will continue
in ~orce. If death occurs within the grace
period, the premium, if unpaid, will be
deducted from the amount payable hereunder.
The policy also provides for reinstatement during
the lifetime of the insured:
(a) within fifteen days after the expiration
of the grace period for the premium in default
without evidence of insurability; or (b) there:
after but within five years from the due date
of the premium in default, upon production of
evidence of insurability satisfactory to the
Company. The reinstatement of this Policy
shall be subject to the payment of all overdue
premiums with interest on such premiums of 5%
per annum compounded annually.
Unless some statutory or common law doctrine to the
contrary prevails, then, the policy lapsed even without the
notice that American Western sent.
This court has already examined and rejected Appellant's
proposed doctrine that an insurer must send notice before
lapse.

In Eme:ry v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 89 Utah

430, 57 P.2d 747 (1936), the insured had borrowed against the
full loan value of a 20-year endowment policy, and therefore
no loan value was available to apply against premiums coming
due.

The trial court found that premiums had not been paid

when due, and that the policy had been forfeited according
to its terms.

The appellant there argued that the insurer

was precluded from forfeiting the policy because it had
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not taken certain steps required by the explicit terms of the
policy for forfeiture for failure to repay a policy loan.
This court emphatically rejected that contention, however,
on the ground that the policy was forfeited automatically
and without any action by the insurer for failure to pay
premiums, regardless of the status of the loan.

The court

stated:
The policy comes into existence and continues
to remain a binding contract only upon the
consideration of the payment of the monthly
premiums of $4.22 payable on delivery of the
policy and a like amount on or before the 8th
day of each month thereafter. Failure to pay
as thus provided would work a lapse of the
policy.

* * *
The loan against the policy having substantially
consumed the cash surrender value, and there
being no dividend accumulations, the insured
having applied the full amount of the loan to
the payment of premiums, of necessity the
policy lapsed upon default of payment of
premiums.
57 P.2d at 748-749.
In the present case, Appellant cannot even point to any
explicit policy terms upon which she could rely to impose a
duty on American Western to take overt steps before forfeiting
the policy.
notices.

She alleges only a "custom" of sending premium

American Western is under no such duty, and the

policy lapsed automatically upon nonpayment of the premium.
The ruling in Emery is in complete accord with the
universally accepted rule that in the absence of special
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provisions which deal with lapse, the operation of provisions
suspending or forfeiting insurance contracts is not affected
by the failure of the insurer to take some affirmative action
or to declare a suspension or forfeiture before lapse.

Beeman

v. Farmers Pioneer Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 104 Iowa 83, 73 N.W. 597
(1897); Continental Ins. Co. v. Stratton, 185 Ky. 523, 215
S.W. 416, 8 A.L.R. 391 (1919); Gifford v. Workmen's Benefit
Ass'n, 105 Me. 17, 72 A. 680 (1908); Robinson v. Continental
Ins. Co., 76 Mich. 641, 43 N.W. 647 (1889); Phenix Ins. Co.
v. Bachelder, 32 Neb. 490, 49 N.W. 217 (1891); Davis v. Home
Ins. Co., 127 Tenn. 330, 155

s.w.

131 (1913).

8 A.L.R. 395 and cases cited thereunder.

See also

Where the continuance

of the policy is dependent upon payment and no contract
provisions extend coverage absent notice of lapse, no notice
is necessary for coverage to lapse.

Hensley v. Aetna

Casualty & Surety Co., 200 N.W.2d 552 (Iowa 1972); Wisniewski
v. Prudential Ins. Corp., 422 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1970); Miner
v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 451 F.2d 1273 (10th
Cir. 1976).
A survey of the present Utah statutory scheme regulating
lapse of life insurance policies also reveals no requirement
of notice.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§

31-22-2 (Repl. 1966),

the instant policy has a grace period wherein the policy shall
continue in force, during which period of grace the payment
may be made.

A policy may be reinstated at any time within

-21-
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three years from the date of premium default provided
insurability can be shown under Utah Code Ann.
(Repl. 1966).

Utah Code Ann.

§

§

31-22-9

31-22-3 (Repl. 1966) allows

the insurer to contest the payment of benefits under the
policy for nonpayment of premiums and recognizes the
ability of the insurer to terminate the policy for nonpayment
of premiums.
Code Ann.

§

Nowhere in the nonforfeiture provisions (Utah
31-22-13, et seq.

(Repl. 1966)) is there any

notice requirement.
Implicit in the statutory scheme is the right of an
insurer to cancel, terminate or otherwise forfeit the policy
µpon a party's failure to pay premium payments as due.

As

the Utah Supreme Court noted in Decker v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 94 Utah 166, 76 P.2d 568 (1938), the very purpose of
the automatic nonforfeiture provisions is to give the
insured the net value of his policy upon cancellation or
lapse.

Where, as here, a term policy has no cash surrender

value or net value, no amount is due the insured upon the
automatic termination of the policy for failure to pay
premium payments.

In short, nowhere in the insurance

provisions of the Utah Code is there any provision that
notice is required for a life insurance policy to be cancelled.
American Western was under no statutory obligation to send
notice to Helen Mallard as a condition of lapse.
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Notwithstanding the lack of any contractual,
statutory or common law duty, however, Appellant contends
that American Western is estopped from declaring the policy
lapsed according to its terms because the company failed
to send her notice of lapse.

Under familiar principles of

estoppel, where an insurance company misleads an insured
by a long-established custom at variance with the terms of
the policy (such as accepting late payments or sending notice
of premiums due) and the insured comes to rely upon that
custom, the insurer cannot suddenly discontinue the custom
without warning and insist on strict compliance with the
policy to the detriment of the insured.

In Pester v. Family

Mut. Ins. Co., 186 Neb. 793, 186 N.W.2d 711 (1971), quoted
by Appellant (Appellant's Brief 21), the elements of estoppel
in these circumstances are laid out.
1.

They are

An established custom, followed continuously
for many years, of sending notice of
premiums due;

2.

Reliance by the insured on the practice, so
that the insured made no other effort to
keep track;

3.

sudden and unexplained termination of the

l~ng-established custom to the detriment of
the insured.
has raised no factual
In the present case, -~p_pellant
~
istence of even one of these
question whatever a b ou t th e ex
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elements, let alone all three.

Not only is there no evidence

of a long-established custom, there is no evidence that
American Western ever sent any notice whatever addressed to
Helen.

Helen could not come to rely upon receiving premium

notices, because she herself had never received one, and
relied on her ex-husband to take care of them.

American Western

did not depart from its prior practice, it followed it exactly:
it sent notice to Ronald at his address on the books of the
company, just as it had always done before.
Appellant has no evidence of the first and most
critical element above, establishment of a custom or practice
for many years of sending notice of premiums.

In Okamura v.

Time Ins. Co., 24 Utah 2d 209, 468 P.2d 958 (1970), the trial
court ruled that the insurer had accepted one premium payment
after expiration of the policy's 31-day grace period and
was therefore estopped from terminating the policy when the
next premium was tendered six days past the expiration of the
grace period.

The Supreme Court reversed, holding that:

We are of the opinion that the acceptance of
one prior premium after the due date is
insufficient to constitute a custom or usage
waiving a requirement of prompt payment. A
custom or usage exists only when followed
for a substantial period of time.
468 P.2d at 959.
In the present case, the record is uncontroverted that
Appellant never received even a single notice of premium due
addressed to her.

If American Western can be said to have

established any custom or usage over such a short period of
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time this policy existed, that custom was to do exactly what
the company did here:

send notice addressed to Ronald at

his address on the books of the company.
There is likewise no factual issue about the second
element of estoppel, that Helen relied upon any custom established by American Western.

Her testimony is unequivocal

that she relied not on her own efforts but on Ronald to take
care of the insurance after the divorce.

She states:

Q.

Did your husband Ron indicate that he would
forward to you any requests for payment of
premiums on the policies?

A.

He said he would handle it. I said, "Are
you sure, because if you don't, then I'll
take care of it."
He said, "No, don't worry, I'll take care
of it." And that was it.

Depo. Helen Mallard 25.
Later, she clarifies her understanding with her exhusband:
Q.

And in the summer of 1976, you asked him
whether he was going to handle the
insurance?

A.

I asked him if he was going to keep up the
insurance policies, and he said ~e'd handle
them. I said, "Well, if you decide not to,
let me know." And he said he would.

Q.

He would let vou know if he didn't handle
them; is that right?

P.••

Right.

Depo. Helen Mallard 47.

-25-
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She expected American Western to deal directly with Ronald
about payment of premiums, obviously, because she expected him
to pay them.

She acquiesced in the arrangement for American

western to send notices to Ronald, with full knowledge of it,
even after the divorce.

She did not require a provision about

the insurance in the divorce decree.

She cannot now be heard

to complain that American Western continued to send notices,
including notice of lapse, to Ronald in accordance with the
custom she had agreed to.
Moreover, whatever custom American Western had followed

1

during Ronald and Helen's marriage, it could hardly be expected

i

to know what Helen wanted in the changed circumstances following

I

the divorce unless she disclosed her wishes to the company.
The last annual policy notice before the 1976 lapse was

I

in December 1975, while Helen was still married to Ronald.
At that time, notice to Ronald was sufficient to notify Helen.
Yet Helen made no effort to make a different arrangement with
American Western after the divorce to meet the changed circumstances.

Requiring separate notice to her in 1976 would be

asking American Western to read her mind.
Nor has Appellant any evidence of the third element of
estoppel, that American Western suddenly and without warning
departed from a prior custom.

Appellant's objection is instead I

that American Western continued to do exactly what it had
always done about sending policy notices:

it sent them to
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Ronald at the same address that they had always gone to.

The

evidence is uncontroverted that in December 1976 American
Western sent notice of lapse to the i'nsured at the address
he and Helen had lived at i'n Logan (D epo. Helen Mallard 45,
4 6 ), as Appellant admits in her brief.
17-18).

(Appellant's Brief

The notice was returned marked "Return to sender,

Undeliverable as Addressed, No Forwarding Order."

(R. 234).

Thus, even if a custom had been established and Helen had
come to rely upon it, American Western did not depart from it.
Appellant argues that it is a question of fact whether
American Western's duty extended beyond sending notice of lapse,
once it was returned by the post office, and whether they were
required to send someone to try to find her.
20).

(Appellant's Brief

The scope of such a duty, of course, is a question of law,

not fact.

Not only does Appellant propose to stretch American

Western's duty far beyond what is reasonable, the record contains
no facts which would sustain a holding of estoppel even if the
duty did extend so far.

Appellant cites the testimony of Martin

Reeder, Ronald's insurance agent, that "as a general rule"
American Western would notify the agent when notices were
returned without forwarding address and ask the agent to
locate the client.

(Appellant's Brief 18).

"As a general rule"

does not demonstrate anything like a custom universally
followed for a substantial period of time.

More important,

Appellant has no evidence whatever that she even knew American
Western had such a "general rule", let alone that she came to
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rely upon it.

This was obviously the first time that she

had even encountered the problem with the company.
Even if all the elements of an estoppel had been
established, the Appellant's argument still falls short of
showing that American Western's failure to track down its
insured was the proximate cause of Helen not knowing the
policy had lapsed.

Helen had agreed both explicitly with

her ex-husband and by her conduct that American Western
should send all premium notices to Ronald, not to her.

If

American Western had a duty to locate the insured upon
receiving the notice back without forwarding address, such a
duty-extended only so far as to locate Ronald, the insured.
It is sheerest speculation by Appellant whether Ronald would
have notified her or not, had American Western made a special
effort to contact him.

Ronald did not tell Helen about the

change of beneficiary on Policy #44498.

There is no reason

to believe he would have notified her of the lapse of Policy
#43476, had American Western made a special effort to contact
him.

Thus any failure of American Western cannot be the

proximate cause of her lack of notice.
What is apparent, of course, is that Appellant's failure
to receive the notice was her own fault.

She knew that

American Western had sent all notices of premiums addressed

in exactly the same manner as the notice of lapse, even after
Ronald had submitted the change of ownership document in July
1974.

If Appellant now contends that American Western had a
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duty to send notice of premiums due and policy lapse to her
as owner by virtue of the 1974 document, she had a reciprocal
duty to object or to inform the company when it sent the
premium notice to Ronald in 1974 and 1975.

Yet she did

nothing to object to these premium notices being addressed
to Ronald.

In fact, she herself paid the premiums with

appliance company funds.
l~estern

Moreover, if she expected American

to send notice to her, she had a duty to inform the

company of her change of address when she moved.
she made no effort to do so.

She admits

(Depo. Helen Mallard 25).

One other factually uncontested matter precludes
Appellant from recovery on Policy #43476:

she has failed to

tender payment of the premiums due as a prerequisite to
reinstatement of the policy.

In Wickes v. State Farm Mut.

Ins. Co., 27 Utah 2d 350, 496 P.2d 267 (1972), the insurer
had a standing offer to reinstate an auto insurance policy if
a past due premium was paid within ten days of its due date,
even though the policy itself had no grace period.

The

insured was killed within two days after the last premium
was due, yet the beneficiary made no tender of the premium
within the ten-day grace period established by custom.

The

court held that the insurer would have been bound by its
standing offer, but the failure to tender payment within the
ten-day grace period absolutely precluded recovery.

In the

present case, the record is devoid of any evidence Appellant

-29-
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ever tendered the premium due December 1976.

Even if American

Western could not declare the policy lapsed until Helen
Mallard had actual notice thereof, any reinstatement of the
policy after the 31-day grace period is expressly conditioned
upon payment of the past due premium with interest.

Appellant

has failed to satisfy this condition after having actual
knowledge of lapse, and is therefore precluded from recovery.

CONCLUSION

Helen Mallard knew that the insurance Ronald Hooker
purchased during their marriage was to pay off the mortgage on
Helen's house.
divorce.

Ronald paid that mortgage in 1977, after their

Knowing that, he allowed one policy to lapse, and

changed the beneficiary on the other to his new wife, Venice.
Helen now insists that she is entitled not only to have her
house paid off, as the policies were intended to do, but also
to more than $140,000 in insurance proceeds besides:

$75,000

on Policy #43476, which Ronald allowed to lapse knowing Helen's
house would be paid off, and $67,500 on Policy #44498, which
Ronald left to Venice.
All Helen's claims are based on the "change of ownership" forms Ronald executed in 1974.

Helen contends they

divested Ronald absolutely and forever of the right to change
or amend them.

Yet by the terms of the policies themselves,

Ronald retained that right, as the insured, to change or amend
the policies.

Moreover, there is no factual dispute that
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the policies, including the "change of ownership" forms, were
intended as security for the mortgage on Helen's house.

Upon

either rationale, Ronald had the right to change the beneficiary
after he had paid off the mortgage on the house.
Helen's overreaching is demonstrated further in her
claim that Policy #43476 could not lapse unless American
Western had first given her actual notice thereof.

Neither

the policy terms nor any statute require such notice.

Helen

had approved and ratified American Western's procedure of
sending all notices to Ronald.

Helen made no contact with

American Western to let the company know where she was, how
she could be contacted, or that she had any continuing interest
in the policy after the divorce.

Yet she asserts that American

Western must go beyond sending notice of lapse to Ronald, as
it did, and make special efforts to locate her and inquire
whether she wanted the policy to lapse.

She is not entitled

to the oroceeds of either policy.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/f~

day of November, 1979.

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
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